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Abstract
This paper studies the ￿nancing of speculative asset-market booms in a stan-
dard framework with heterogeneous beliefs and short-sales constraints. Cash-
constrained optimists use their asset holdings as collateral to raise debt ￿nancing
from less optimistic creditors. Through state-contingent re￿nancing, short-term
debt allows the optimists to reduce debt payment in upper states which they as-
sign higher probabilities to, but at the expense of greater rollover risk if the asset
fundamental deteriorates at the debt maturity. Our model identi￿es distinctive
e⁄ects of initial and future belief dispersion in driving a short-term credit boom,
and shows that it can initially fuel an asset-market boom and then exacerbate
the downturn when asset fundamental deteriorates.
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1 Introduction
The notion that speculation leading to both booms and crises rests on an inherent instability
of credit has a long history in economics. As summarized by Kindleberger (2000), a host of
classical economists including Irving Fisher, Henry Simons, and Hyman Minsky emphasized
the role of debt contracted to leverage the acquisition of speculative assets for future resale
and the role of debt structures in causing ￿nancial di¢ culties. There is also growing evidence
of pronounced cycles of credit expansion and contraction that accompany the boom-and-crisis
cycles of asset markets: White (1990) and Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) for the stock
market boom and crash of 1929; Adrian and Shin (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Gorton and
Metrick (2009), and Krishnamurthy (2010) for the recent credit crisis in 2007-2008; Rodrik
and Velasco (1999) and Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2009) for the emerging-market debt crises in
1990s. In particular, there is a salient pattern in the increasing use of short-term credit in
the booming periods of these boom-and-crisis episodes.
Motivated by the importance of credit in these episodes, this paper develops a dynamic
model to analyze the inherent instability of credit and its role in fueling speculative booms
and in driving debt crises. Our model builds on the standard asset-market framework that
combines both heterogeneous beliefs and short-sales constraints, e.g., Miller (1977), Harrison
and Kreps (1978), Morris (1996), Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), and Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003). In this framework, short-sales constraints cause the equilibrium asset prices to
bias toward the beliefs of the optimists. However, existing models tend to ignore how
optimists ￿nance their speculative positions. In this regard, we follow Geanakoplos (2009),
who had long advocated to incorporate the asset￿ s collateral value into standard asset-market
equilibrium models. His most recent paper provides a model with heterogeneous beliefs to
highlight the important role played by leverage cycles in driving asset market cycles. Our
model di⁄ers from Geanakoplos￿ ￿ not only do we focus on the optimists￿leverage choice, but
also on the role of debt structure (e.g. long term vs. short term) in a⁄ecting their ￿nancing
cost and leverage choice. The endogenous leverage and maturity choice jointly determine
the equilibrium asset price dynamics.
Speci￿cally, our model has two periods and a risky asset whose fundamental value is
unobservable and ￿ uctuates over time. We consider two groups of risk-neutral agents holding
heterogeneous and state-contingent beliefs, which originate from their heterogeneous prior
beliefs and learning processes, about the asset fundamental. If the optimists have su¢ cient
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funds, they would acquire all the asset and bid up the asset price to their optimistic valuation
in settings where the optimists always hold the most optimistic belief (e.g., Miller (1977)), or
to be even higher than their optimistic valuation in settings where other agents￿beliefs may
rise above the optimists￿in the future (e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1978)). If the optimists
have insu¢ cient funds, then they have to use their asset holdings as collateral to raise debt
￿nancing from the pessimists who have excess funds. The ￿nancing cost directly a⁄ects the
credit the optimists will use and the price they can o⁄er for the asset. As a result, the asset
market equilibrium is jointly determined with the credit market equilibrium. In our model,
we restrict the optimists to standard non-contingent debt contracts, which are widely used
in practice.1 Despite this restriction, the optimists nevertheless face a non-trivial choice of
debt structure to raise ￿nancing from the pessimistic creditors.
To tease out the ￿nancing problem, it is useful to consider the ￿rst-best allocation of
the asset payo⁄s between the optimists and pessimists. Since the optimists assign higher
probabilities to the upper states (i.e., states higher than a certain threshold) and lower
probabilities to the lower states, the ￿rst-best allocation is to assign the asset payo⁄s in the
upper states to the optimists, and those in the lower states to the pessimists. However, the
￿rst best payo⁄ allocation is infeasible if agents only have access to non-state contingent
debt ￿nancing. The standard non-contingent long-term debt, which stipulates a monotone
payo⁄ structure, is especially ine¢ cient in this regard. More speci￿cally, the long-term debt
contract requires the optimistic borrower to make the promised payment in full in the upper
states, which he values highly, but not so highly by the creditor. This makes the credit rather
costly to the borrower. Indeed, our analysis shows that the ￿nancing cost indirectly pulls the
equilibrium asset price toward the pessimistic creditors￿beliefs and can even overturn the
standard result that heterogeneous beliefs lead to an overvaluation of assets. This outcome
echoes a recent paper by Simsek (2009), who also shows that ￿nancing cost can severely
constrain optimists from bidding up asset prices in a static setting.
A key insight of our model is that state-contingent re￿nancing of short-term debt allows
the optimists to structure state-contingent debt payo⁄s to reduce the ￿nancing cost. Suppose
an optimistic borrower initially uses a short-term debt contract that matures on the interim
date. If the asset fundamental improves when the debt matures, the borrower will obtain a
1Non-contigent debt contract is shown to be optimal in the costly state veri￿cation model of Townsend
(1979), the monitoring model of Diamond (1984), and the contingent future ￿nancing model of Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990). In these models, the unobservability of cash ￿ ows is important for the debt contract to
be optimal.
2better term in re￿nancing and thus be able to keep a greater fraction of the asset payo⁄s
in the subsequent upper states to himself. This bene￿t, which can be termed as speculative
incentive, motivates the use of short-term debt. However, there is also an opposing force.
If the asset fundamental deteriorates, he will have to promise a higher debt payment to
obtain re￿nancing or even to lose the collaterized asset in whole. As he still holds a more
optimistic view about the asset fundamental, his greater promise (or the asset if forfeited)
is under-valued by the creditor. Such under-valuation represents the so-called rollover risk,
which has been increasingly recognized as a key trigger of short-term debt crises.2 In our
model, the optimists￿initial speculative incentive and the subsequent rollover risk jointly
determine whether short-term debt is desirable.
In particular, our model highlights the distinctive roles of belief dispersion at di⁄erent
times. A higher initial belief dispersion about the asset fundamental over the ￿rst period
creates a greater speculative incentive for the optimists and thus makes short-term debt
more desirable, while a higher belief dispersion after the fundamental deteriorates on the
interim date increases the borrower￿ s rollover risk and discourages the use of short-term
debt. The tradeo⁄ between the initial and future belief dispersion enriches the two-state
setting considered by Geanakoplos (2009), who suggests that the higher accumulative belief
dispersion over long-run (which also holds in our model) should always make short-term debt
more desirable.
Our model shows that short-term debt allows the optimists to substantially reduce their
￿nancing cost over a broad region where the high cost of long-term debt ￿nancing would
have constrained their capacity to bid up the asset prices. Our model thus explains the
synchronization of short-term credit booms and asset price booms, a phenomenon commonly
observed in various boom-and-crisis episodes (see Section 4 for three examples). Furthermore,
short-term debt also acts as the bridge from booms to crises. As the asset fundamental
deteriorates, the optimists will face di¢ culties in rolling over their short-term debt and may
even be forced to turn over their asset to the pessimistic creditors at a substantial discount.
Taken together, the inherent instability of short-term debt ￿nancing initially fuels the asset
market boom created by the rise of heterogeneous beliefs between optimists and pessimists,
and then exacerbates the downturn when the asset fundamental deteriorates.
2See Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009) and He and Xiong (2009a, 2009b). In contrast to these
models, the under-valuation (or the so-called ￿resale discount) in our model is endogenously determined by
the heterogeneous beliefs between the borrowers and creditors.
3The long debate on whether the commonly observed credit expansions that accompanied
various asset-market booms were driven by supply shocks, such as expansionary monetary
policies and external capital in￿ ows, or by internally generated demand for credit is still
unsettled.3 The supply- and demand-driven factors have probably played di⁄erent roles in
di⁄erent episodes. Our model helps understanding the demand-driven credit expansions,
especially the expansions of short-term credit during asset-market booms. This salient phe-
nomenon cannot be easily explained by any supply-side theory. The emphasis of our model
also di⁄ers from those focusing on the tightening of credit during crises (e.g., Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009)) and those on the shortening of debt maturity during crises (e.g., He
and Xiong (2009a) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2009)). In particular, our model suggests
that the concurrent short-term credit boom and asset-price boom are a potentially useful
predictor for future crises. Our model also provides insights regarding regulating short-term
leverages.
Our model is related to the literature that studies the pervasive use of short-term debt by
banks and ￿nancial ￿rms. The existing literature has emphasized several advantages of short-
term debt. First, short-term debt is a natural solution to a variety of agency problems inside
a ￿rm, e.g., Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2009). By choosing short-
term ￿nancing, creditors keep the option to pull out if they discover that ￿rm managers are
pursuing value-destroying projects. Second, the short commitment period also makes short-
term debt less information sensitive and thus less exposed to adverse-selection problems, e.g.,
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). While these theories imply that ￿rms regularly use certain
amounts of short-term debt, they do not explain the increasing use of short-term debt during
asset-market booms.
Finally, our model complements Garmaise (2001), who studies the security-design prob-
lem of a cash-constrained ￿rm facing investors with heterogeneous beliefs. His model con-
trasts the optimal security design under heterogeneous beliefs to that under rational expec-
tations, while our model focuses on the role played by debt structure in fueling asset-market
speculation driven by heterogeneous beliefs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a baseline model with two groups
3Kindleberger (2000) provides a detailed account on di⁄erent views about the driving force of credit
expansions. See Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) for an analysis of the argument that excessive supply of
credit had fueled the stock market boom before the 1929 market crash, and White (1990) for the argument
that the demand for credit to buy stocks had pulled funds into the market as the cost of credit had risen in
sync with the use of credit.
4Figure 1: Timeline.
of agents holding exogenously speci￿ed beliefs. Section 3 extends the baseline model with
learning and three groups of agents. We discuss the implications of the model in Section 4,
and ￿nally conclude in Section 5. All technical proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Asset and Agents
Consider a model with three dates and two periods. The date is indexed by t = 0;1;2:
There is a long-term risky asset, which we interpret either as a house or a mortgage backed
security. The asset pays a ￿nal payo⁄ on date 2. The ￿nal payo⁄ is determined by the ￿nal
realization of a publicly observable binomial tree. Figure 1 illustrates the tree. The tree can
go either up or down from t = 0 to t = 1 and from t = 1 to t = 2: The tree has four possible
paths, which we denote by uu, ud, du, and dd (here, u stands for ￿up￿and d stands for
￿down￿ ), and three possible ￿nal nodes (paths ud and du lead to the same ￿nal node). We
normalize the ￿nal payo⁄ of the risky asset at the end of path uu as 1; at the end of paths
ud and du as ￿; and at the end of paths dd as ￿
2; where ￿ 2 (0;1): We denote the asset





The probability of the tree going up in each period is unobservable. Suppose that there
are two groups of risk-neutral agents, who di⁄er in their beliefs about these probabilities.
5Table 1: Asset Payo⁄ and Agent￿ s Belief across Di⁄erent Paths
Tree Paths
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In this section, we exogenously specify two sets of beliefs for the agents. Ultimately, the
di⁄erence in the agents￿beliefs is driven by their prior beliefs and learning processes, and we
will extend the model with learning in Section 3.
There are three intermediate nodes on the tree, one on date 0 and two on date 1 (u
and d depending on whether the tree goes up or down in the ￿rst period). We collect these
intermediate nodes in the following set: f0;u;dg: At each of the nodes, each agent has a
belief about the probability of the tree going up in the following period. We collect each
agent￿ s beliefs in the following set: f￿i
0;￿i
u;￿i
dg; where i 2 fh;lg indicates the agent￿ s type.
Throughout this section, we assume that the h-type agents are always more optimistic than
the l-type agents across all the intermediate nodes (here, the superscript ￿h￿and ￿l￿stands
for high and low.) That is, ￿h
n > ￿l
n for any n 2 f0;u;dg: Based on the relative order, we
call the h-type agents optimists and the l-type pessimists.
In particular, we emphasize that the belief dispersion between the optimists and pes-
simists is not constant. Standing at t = 0; the di⁄erence between ￿h
0 and ￿l
0 represents the
initial belief dispersion between the two groups about the asset fundamental from date 0 to
1, while the di⁄erence between ￿h
d and ￿l
d represents the future belief dispersion about the
asset fundamental from the date-1 state d to date 2: As we will show later, these two types
of belief dispersion play distinctive roles in determining the optimal debt maturity choice.
We summarize the ￿nal asset payo⁄s at the end of the four possible tree paths and the
optimists￿and pessimists￿belief about each of the paths in Table 1. Note that the optimists
assign a higher probability to path uu and a lower probability to path dd. But his beliefs
about the middle paths ud and du can be higher or lower than those of the pessimists, which
we will speci￿cally discuss later.
We normalize the total supply of the asset to be one unit. There are ￿ 2 (0;1) units of
6optimists, who are homogeneous. On date 0; each optimist is initially endowed with 1 unit
of the risky asset and c dollars of cash. Given the optimists￿optimism, it is natural for them
to purchase the rest of the asset (1 ￿ ￿ unit) from the pessimists. Following Miller (1977),
Harrison and Kreps (1978), Morris (1996), Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), and Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003), we assume that short-sales of the asset are not allowed. As a result, the
pessimists cannot speculate on the asset price falling in the future and will sit on the sideline.
The focus of our analysis is on the ￿nancing of the optimists￿asset purchases. Since they
may not have su¢ cient cash, they may need to borrow from the pessimists who sit on the
sideline with cash. As the pessimists￿beliefs a⁄ect the cost of ￿nancing to the optimists, their
beliefs can indirectly a⁄ect the equilibrium asset price.For simplicity, we assume that both
the risk-free interest rate and the agents￿dscount rate are zero, and that the pessimists on
the sideline will always have su¢ cient cash. Therefore, in equilibrium they always demand
zero expected return in ￿nancing the optimists.
2.2 Collaterilized Debt Financing
Like Geanakoplos (2009), we assume that the optimists use their asset holdings as collateral
to obtain debt ￿nancing. We focus on non-contingent debt contracts. A non-contingent debt
contract speci￿es a constant debt payment (face value) at maturity unless the borrower de-
faults. Non-contingent debt contracts are widely used in practice. Townsend (1979) explains
its popularity based on the cost of verifying the state of the world. That is, non-contingent
debt contracts circumvent the cost of verifying the value of the collateral as long as the
borrower makes the promised payment. Diamond (1984) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)
also derive the optimality of non-contingent debt based on unobservability of cash ￿ ows. In
this model, we will restrict the optimists to use only non-contingent debt.
We will ￿rst discuss long-term debt contracts, and then short-term ones. We will restrict





: We will show in Lemma 2 in Section
2.3.2 that this is without loss of generality in the equilibrium.
2.2.1 Long-term Debt
Consider a long-term debt contract, which is collateralized by one unit of the asset. The





. The debt payment is





7Table 2: Asset Payo⁄ and Debt Payment across Di⁄erent Paths
Tree Path
uu ud du dd
Asset payo⁄ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿
2





FL FL FL ￿
2





FS FS FS;1 ￿ FS ￿
2
Short-term debt face value FS 2 [Kd;￿] FS FS ￿ ￿
2
Depending on the four possible paths of the tree, the asset payo⁄ and debt payment are
listed in Table 2. Given the debt payment, a pessimistic creditor is willing to provide the
following credit on date 0:































n [￿] denotes the conditional expectation of a type-i agent on node n 2 f0;u;dg: On
































The di⁄erence between (1) and (2) highlights a key feature of our model￿ the borrower
and creditor use di⁄erent probabilities in assessing the cost and value of a debt contract.
In particular, as the borrower is optimistic and assigns a higher probability to path uu, the
promised payment FL at the end of this path is more costly to the borrower than valued
by the creditor. Thus, the ￿rst-best allocation of asset payo⁄s between the borrower and
creditor would be to assign all of the asset payo⁄ at the end of path uu to the borrower.
However, such a non-monotonic allocation is infeasible under standard non-contingent debt
contracts, which stipulates monotonic payo⁄s.
Interestingly, as we will show next, the standard non-contingent short-termdebt￿ through
re￿nancing￿ can generate non-monotone debt payments, which is the main advantage of
short-term debt over long-term debt.
82.2.2 Short-term Debt
We now consider a short-term debt contract collateralized by one unit of asset, and with a





due on date 1. Di⁄erent from long-term debt, short-term
debt requires re￿nancing (or rollover) at date 1: A key insight of our model is that state-
contingent re￿nancing of short-term debt makes it possible for the borrower to reduce debt
payment at the end of path uu by trading up payments at the end of some lower paths.
Speci￿cally, in the upper interim state u; the borrower can always get a new contract
with the same face value FS, because the asset payo⁄ is always su¢ cient to pay o⁄ the debt
regardless of the subsequent ￿nal state being 1 or ￿. However, in the lower interim state
d, the borrower will get a worse term and may even lose the asset if the initially promised
payment is too large. Speci￿cally, the face value of the new contract FS;1 needs to ensure
that the pessimistic lender￿ s valuation of the new debt contract is su¢ cient for o⁄setting the










Since the highest possible date-2 payment the borrower can promise is ￿, the maximum
























2 < ￿: (3)
This implies that the borrower will fail to re￿nance his short-term debt in the interim state
d if the initially promised date-1 debt payment FS is higher than Kd: Therefore, we have the
following two cases to consider:





; the initial short-term debt is riskless and the borrower can obtain a
credit of CS (FS) = FS on date 0. In the lower interim state d, the borrower can roll











2 ￿ FS: (4)
The borrower has to promise more as the value of the collateral has deteriorated.
2. If FS 2 (Kd;￿]; the initial debt contract is risky. In the lower interim state d; the
payment due exceeds the maximum amount of debt the borrower can re￿nance from
any pessimistic creditor using the asset as the collateral. The borrower thus defaults
9and loses the asset to the creditor. This outcome is equivalent to the ￿nal debt payment
at the end of paths du and dd being ￿ and ￿
2; respectively. By using this debt contract,
on date 0 the borrower can get a credit of:


















if FS 2 (Kd;￿]:
Table 2 summarizes the ￿nal debt payments across the four possible tree paths for the
two cases discussed above. In both cases, the state-contingent re￿nancing makes the ￿nal
debt payment non-monotonic with respect to the ￿nal asset payo⁄, i.e., the debt payment
at the end of paths uu and ud is lower than at the end of path du. This rearrangement of
debt payment is potentially valuable to the borrower as he assigns a higher probability to
path uu than the creditor.
2.3 The Optimal Debt Contract
To study the optimal debt contract used by an optimistic buyer, we take the asset price p0
as given. In light of Table 2, we denote a debt contract (either long-term or short-term) by










date-0 credit that a borrower can obtain from a pessimist by using the debt contract e D.
What is the maximum unit of asset that an optimist can a⁄ord on date 0 by using the
debt contract e D? He is initially endowed with c dollars of cash and 1 unit of the asset.





; the sum of his cash endowment and the credit he can raise by using his
asset holding (1 + xi units in total) as collateral. The budget contraint implies that













An implicit assumption in this calculation is that the optimist maxes out his purchasing
power, a conjecture that we will verify in Propositions 5 and 6. For each unit of asset, the




e ￿ ￿ e D
i
: Therefore, the optimist￿ s date-0 value from using the contract e D (i.e., the































10This expression illustrates the tradeo⁄ in the optimist￿ s debt choice. On one hand, by
promising a collaterized debt payment e D on each unit of asset holding, the buyer can raise




and thus establish a larger initial position
c+p0





: This term represents a leverage e⁄ect. On the other hand, the debt payment
















The debt contract contains two dimensions: debt maturity (long-term or short-term) and
promised payment (i.e., the debt face value). Both are determined by the tradeo⁄ between
the leverage e⁄ect and debt-cost e⁄ect. We will ￿rst analyze the agent￿ s maturity choice,
and then the face-value choice.
2.3.1 Maturity Choice
To derive the optimal debt maturity, we consider the following question: in order to raise
the same amount of credit at t = 0; which contract (i.e., long-term or short-term) entails the
lower expected cost? Equation (6) implies that the one with the lower cost dominates the
other. The following key proposition shows that the optimal maturity choice is determined
by the initial and future belief dispersion between the optimists and pessimists.
Proposition 1 Consider two debt contracts, one short-term and the other long-term. Sup-





and give the same date-0 credit to an
optimistic borrower. Then, from the borrower￿ s perspective on date 0, the short-term contract


















Proposition 1 shows that whether the short-term debt contract dominates the long-term
debt contract depends on the initial belief ratio between the optimists and pessimists (￿h
0=￿l
0
about the ￿rst-period fundamental), and the future belief ratio in the lower interim state
d (￿h
d=￿l
d about the second-period fundamental.) The short-term contract is dominant if
the initial belief ratio is su¢ ciently large, or if the future belief ratio is su¢ ciently small.
Moverover, Proposition 1 holds for any given debt face value and is not restricted just to the
face value used in the equilibrium. In this sense, the insight conveyed by the proposition is
more general than the speci￿c (binomial-tree) setting considered in our paper.
11To understand the intuition, a debt contract not only channels the necessary ￿nancing
from a creditor to an optimistic borrower to purchase the asset, but also represents an
allocation of the asset payo⁄s between the borrower and creditor. As we have discussed
earlier, a long-term contract speci￿es a monotonic debt payment with respsect to the asset
payo⁄, while a short-term contract allows the borrower to reduce the debt payments at the
end of paths uu and ud by trading up the payment at the end of path du (the payment at
the end of path dd is maxed out.)
Is this tradeo⁄ worthwhile? It ￿rst depends on the initial belief ratio ￿h
0=￿l
0. If this ratio
becomes higher, the reduced future debt payment after the upper interim state u becomes
more valuable to the borrower and the increased payment after the lower interim state d
becomes less important. Conversely, the creditor ￿nds the reduced payment after u less
important, while the increased payment after d more valuable. As a result, the short-term
debt contract becomes more desirable to both of the borrower and creditor. This e⁄ect
re￿ ects the two parties￿speculative incentives driven by their initial belief dispersion.
There is also the so-called rollover-risk e⁄ect working against short-term debt. In the
lower interim state d, the borrower still holds the more optimistic belief going forward.
This means that the increased future debt payment is under-valued by the creditor. In other
words, the borrower gives up some future asset payo⁄s at a price lower than his own valuation.
In the extreme case, if he cannot obtain su¢ cient re￿nancing to repay his maturing debt
obligation, he has to give up the asset in whole to the creditor who does not value the asset
as much as he does. This under-valuation of the increased debt payment is determined by
the belief ratio between the borrower and creditor ￿h
d=￿l
d in the interim state d. When this
ratio becomes large, the rollover-risk e⁄ect becomes severe and thus makes it more costly for
the borrower to use short-term debt.
Proposition 1 re￿ ects the tradeo⁄between the speculative-incentive e⁄ect and the rollover-
risk e⁄ect, and ties this tradeo⁄to the dynamics of the agents￿heterogeneous beliefs. A close
look at the path du makes this connection crystal clear. The state-contingent debt re￿nanc-
ing allows the borrower to trade up the debt payment at the end of path du for lower


















d. Then, the borrower thinks this path is less likely than
the creditor. As a result, their speculative incentives make the short-term debt desirable.





￿nds this path more likely than the creditor. As a result, the short-term debt is more costly
to the borrower because of the rollover risk.4
As the optimists hold a more optimistic belief than the pessimists about the asset fun-
damental in each period, the accumulative belief dispersion between them increases with
time horizon. Geanakoplos (2009) argues that this property of belief dispersion is su¢ cient
to ensure the dominance of short-term debt over long-term debt in a setting with only two
states. Proposition 1 shows that this argument may be speci￿c to his model. In contrast,
in our more general framework, the result may reverse: short-term debt is more desirable
precisely when the initial disagreement about the ￿rst-period fundamental is high and future
disagreement about the second-period fundamental is low.
2.3.2 Optimal Debt Face Value
To derive the optimal debt face value, we ￿rst characterize its feasible range:
















Lemma 2 shows that the optimal debt face value (for either long-term or short-term





. The condition for this result￿ the date-0 asset price
lies between the pessimists￿and optimists￿asset valuations￿ is innocuous because it always
holds in the equilibrium throughout this section. When we extend the model to incorporate
learning in the next section and allow agents￿beliefs to ￿ ip on date 1, the equilibrium asset
price could be higher than the optimists￿asset valuation because of the asset owner￿ s resale
option. However, the feasible range of the optimal debt face value derived in Lemma 2 still
holds after we modify the condition to account for the resale option.
The intuition of Lemma 2 is as follows. If the optimal debt face value is lower than ￿
2;
then the debt is risk free. Thus, increasing the face value by a small amount ￿ does not
change the risk of the debt, and thus allows the borrower to increase his initial ￿nancing by
￿ at a cost exactly equal to ￿. Since the asset price is lower than his asset valuation, the
increased credit allows him to take a larger asset position and therefore be better o⁄. This
shows that the optimal debt face value cannot be smaller than ￿
2: On the other hand, if the
4Condition (7) implies that even if both agents argree on the probability of the path du, ￿h
0=￿l
0 still plays












1d, the borrower still gains by saving on the paths uu
and ud; which he thinks are more likely to occur than the lender. This explains the appearance of the ratio
￿h
0=￿l
0 on the LHS of (7).
13optimal debt face value is higher than ￿; the borrower always defaults on the debt except
at the end of the path uu. This implies that reducing the face value by a small amount ￿
allows the borrower to save debt payment at the end of path uu, which he values more than
the creditor. Of course, this also cuts down his initial asset position. In the proof provided
in Appendix A.2, we show that as long as the asset price is higher than the pessimistic
creditor￿ s asset valuation, the borrower is better o⁄ by reducing the debt face value. Thus,
the optimal debt face value cannot be higher than ￿ either.
The following proposition provides the borrower￿ s optimal long-term debt face value
conditional on long-term debt being more desirable.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the condition in (7) does not hold. Thus, it is optimal for the




































Then, the borrower￿ s optimal debt face value is ￿ if p0 < PM; is either ￿ or ￿
2 if p0 = PM;
or is ￿
2 if p0 > PM.
The discrete asset payo⁄ implies that varying the long-term debt face value FL between
￿
2 and ￿ does not change the risk of the debt. In other words, regardless of the value of FL
in this region, the borrower will always make the promised debt payment FL at the end of
paths uu, ud, and du, and default and thus give up all the asset payo⁄at the end of dd. Since
the borrower is risk-neutral, he will use the highest face value ￿ to maximize his position
if the asset price is below a critical level PM, which weighs his asset valuation and cost of
￿nancing. More precisely, PM is a weighted average of the borrower￿ s asset valuation in the
upper (non-default) states fuu;ud;dug and the creditor￿ s valuation in the lower (default)
state dd. If we interpret the long-term debt contract as a static contract that spans two
periods, then Proposition 3 is analogous to the result of Simsek (2009).
If the borrower uses short-term debt, the default risk of the contract depends on whether
the debt face value is higher or lower than Kd; where Kd is the asset￿ s maximum debt capacity
in the lower interim state d: If the face value is between ￿
2 and Kd, the borrower is always
able to re￿nance and the initial debt contract is risk free, even though the follow-up contract
in the interim state d is risky as the borrower will default on date 2 at the end of path dd.
If the face value is between Kd and ￿, the borrower cannot get a new debt contract to pay
o⁄ the initial debt in the state d, and thus default on the debt.
14In the same spirit to Proposition 3, the next proposition shows that the borrower will





and [Kd;￿] if the asset
price is below two thresholds PH and PL, respectively. These thresholds re￿ ect the borrower￿ s
asset valuation and the cost of using debt in these regions.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the condition in (7) holds. Thus, it is optimal for the borrower












































































PL < PM < PH:
Then, the borrower￿ s optimal short-term debt face value is ￿ if p0 < PL; is either ￿ or Kd if
p0 = PL; is Kd if PL < p0 < PH; is either Kd or ￿
2 if p0 = PH; or is ￿
2 if p0 > PH:
The core of Propositions 3 and 4 is that when the asset price becomes cheaper relative
to the buyer￿ s own valuation (after adjusting for the ￿nancing cost), he will demand a
greater position. To ￿nance the greater position, he uses a higher debt face value to obtain
more credit. In the next subsection, we will use these two propositions to derive the joint
equilibrium of the asset and credit markets.
2.4 The Equilibrium of Asset and Credit Markets
We now derive the equilibrium on dates 0 and 1.
2.4.1 Date 0
The amount of asset purchase by an individual optimistic buyer using a debt contract e D
is given by Equation (5). Propositions 1, 3, and 4 jointly determine the optimal contract
e D(p0) based on the buyer￿ s and creditor￿ s heterogeneous beliefs and the asset price p0. The
total measure of buyers in the economy is ￿. Their aggregate purchase
P
i xi should equal
to the total asset endowed by the (pessimistic) sellers 1 ￿ ￿:
X
i
xi = 1 ￿ ￿: (8)
15Figure 2: The equilibrium with long-term debt ￿nancing.
















= (1 ￿ ￿)p0 ￿ ￿c. (9)
This equation illustrates the intricate interaction between the asset price and the endoge-
nously determined amount of credit to the asset buyers. In light of Propositions 3 and 4,




on the left hand side￿ decreases
with the asset price p0. On the other hand, the credit available to the buyers needs to be
su¢ cient to support their asset purchases (market clearing condition), i.e., in equilibrium the
buyers￿aggregate cash shortfalls should equate their credit demand. The linearly increasing
function on the right hand side gives the buyers￿cash shortfall￿ the value of their purchases
(1 ￿ ￿ shares multiplied by the price p0 ) minus their cash endowments ￿c.
Long-term Debt Equilibrium Figure 2 plots the two sides of (9) when the condition
in (7) fails and borrowers prefer to use long-term debt. As derived in Proposition 3, each




or CL (￿): The two-piece





the left hand side of (9). The upward sloping curve represents the necessary credit needed
to clear the asset market, the right hand side of (9).
As the intercept of the asset-market clearing condition (￿￿c) increases, we encounter
three possible cases in equilibrium. First, if each buyer￿ s cash endowment c is high, the
optimal credit demand curve and the asset-market clearing condition intersect at a point,
where the equilibrium asset price p0 is higher than PM and each buyer demands a modest




. We label this case by case LD1. In this case, the buyers￿ample
cash endowments allow them to bid up the asset price to a high level without using much
credit. Second, if each buyer￿ s cash endowment c is low, the two curves intersect at a point,
where the equilibrium price p0 is lower than PM and each buyer demands a large amount
of credit CL (￿). We label this case by case LD3. In this case, the buyers￿limited cash
endowments constrain the price from rising high even though each buyer uses an aggresive
debt contract.
The case LD2 occurs when the upward sloping asset-market clearing condition passes
the middle of the two horizontal levels of the buyers￿credit demand curve. In this case,
the equilibrium price is exactly PM and each buyer is indi⁄erent between using long-term
debt contracts with face values ￿ and ￿
2 (Proposition 3). Then, the asset market clearing
condition (8) is ful￿lled by ￿nding a certain mix of buyers using these two contracts. Denote
by ￿ the fraction of buyers using the contract with face value ￿: Condition (8) is equivalent
to
￿￿
c + CL (￿)
PM ￿ CL (￿)




















In the following proposition, we summarize the discussion on the joint equilibrium of the
asset and credit markets in which the buyers only use long-term debt contracts. In addition,
we prove that the buyers have no incentive to keep cash on date 0.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the condition in (7) fails and the buyers use long-term debt
contracts to ￿nance their asset purchases. Then, there is no incentive for any buyer to save
cash and the equilibrium can be broken down into the following three cases:





> (1 ￿ ￿)PM ￿ ￿c, then p0 =
￿c+CL(￿2)
1￿￿ and all the buyers use the same






￿ (1 ￿ ￿)PM ￿ ￿c ￿ CL (￿), then p0 = PM and each buyer is indi⁄erent
between the long-term debt contracts with face values of ￿ and ￿
2, with the fraction of
buyers using the former contract given in (10);
-LD3: If CL (￿) < (1 ￿ ￿)PM ￿ ￿c, then p0 =
￿c+CL(￿)
1￿￿ and all the buyers use the same
long-term debt contract with face value ￿:
Short-term Debt Equilibrium If the condition in (7) holds, the buyers would prefer
short-term debt. Figure 3 shows ￿ve possible cases for the equilibrium. Proposition 6 lists
these cases. The logic for these cases is similar to that for Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the condition in (7) holds and the buyers use short-term debt
contracts to ￿nance their asset purchases. Then, there is no incentive for any buyer to save





> (1 ￿ ￿)PH ￿ ￿c; then p0 =
￿c+CS(￿2)
1￿￿ and all the buyers use the same






￿ (1 ￿ ￿)PH ￿ ￿c ￿ CS (Kd); then p0 = PH and each buyer is indi⁄erent
between the short-term debt contracts with face values of Kd and ￿
2, with the fraction










-SD3: If (1 ￿ ￿)PL￿￿c < CS (Kd) < (1 ￿ ￿)PH ￿￿c; then p0 =
￿c+CS(Kd)
1￿￿ and all the buyers
use the same short-term debt contract with face value Kd;
-SD4: If CS (Kd) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)PL ￿ ￿c ￿ CS (￿); then p0 = PL and each buyer is indi⁄erent
between the short-term debt contracts with face values of ￿ and Kd, with the fraction










-SD5: If CS (￿) < (1 ￿ ￿)PL ￿ ￿c; then p0 =
￿c+CS(￿)
1￿￿ and all the buyers use the same short-
term debt contract with face value ￿:
2.4.2 Date 1
On date 1, there are two states: u and d: In the upper state u, each asset holder￿ s ￿nancial
condition is strong. Regardless of the possible equilibrium debt contract he has taken on
date 0, he faces no default risk going forward. If he has used a short-term debt contract, he
can always re￿nance the maturing debt with a new one. Thus, any potential buyer of the
















In the lower state d, the equilibrium depends on the debt contracts used by the asset
holders on date 0. As shown by Propositions 5 and 6, the optimists do not save any cash on
date 0. As a result, if any asset holder runs into ￿nancial distress after the asset fundamental
deteriorates in state d, the price of the asset is determined by the pessimists, instead of the
optimists. We determine the equilibrium asset price in this state by the shadow cost of a
potential buyer, who needs to buy out the stake of the current asset holder in the asset as
well as the stake of his creditor.
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium on date 1.
Proposition 7 On date 1, in the upper state u; each asset holder faces no default risk going
forward and the asset price is given in (11). In the lower state d, the equilibrium depends
19Figure 4: An illustration of the equilibrium e⁄ect of using short-term debt.
on the debt contracts used by the asset holders, which are given by di⁄erent cases derived in
Propositions 5 and 6. In cases LD1 and SD1, all the asset holders use debt contracts with
face value ￿
2; and face no default risk going forward. As a result, the equilibrium asset price

















In the other cases, at least some of the asset holders used aggresive debt contracts with face
values of Kd or ￿, and these asset holders are now in distress. As a result, the equilibrium

















2.5 The Role of Short-term Debt
We now analyze the equilibrium e⁄ect of short-term debt in ￿nancing optimistic buyers￿asset
purchases. To facilitate our analysis, suppose that short-term debt is initially not available
and asset buyers have access only to long-term debt. Figure 4 illustrates the changes in the
equilibrium after the asset buyers have access to short-term debt.
Let us ￿rst focus on Case A shown in the ￿gure. In the absence of short-term debt,
the asset buyers manage to purchase the asset at a price higher than PM by using risk-free
long-term debt. As we have derived in Proposition 5, this situation occurs only when the
20asset buyers￿initial cash endowment is reasonably high so that a modest amount of leverage
is enough for the buyers to clear the asset market. The price level is also high so that each
buyer is discouraged from using the more aggresive long-term debt contract with face value
￿ to take a greater position. However, if the buyers are allowed to use short-term debt
contracts, their credit demand curve shifts up when the asset price p0 is between the two
critical levels PM and PH: This is because short-term debt allows the buyers to obtain the
same credit at a lower cost under the condition in Proposition 1. This shift causes buyers to
use more credit and results in a higher equilibrium asset price. Figure 4 allows us to precisely
identify the condition for this situation to occur and the exact changes in equilirbium price
and credit usage.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the condition in (7) holds, and that
(1 ￿ ￿)PM ￿ ￿c < CS (Kd):
Then, after the introduction of short-term debt, the equilibrium asset price on date 0 in-
creases, and the price increase is supported by the use of the short-term debt contract with
face value Kd by at least some of the asset buyers.
To some extent the situation analyzed in Proposition 8 is analogous to the US housing
market in the pre-ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) era. Before the ARMs became popular
in the last decade, home buyers had predominantly relied on 30-year ￿xed rate mortgages
to ￿nance their home purchases. Historically speaking, these long-term mortgage loans
had low default rates. According to Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009), the share of US
mortgage loans that were ￿seriously deliquent￿(90 days or more past due or in the process
of foreclosure) averaged only 1.7 percent from 1979 to 2006. These ￿xed-rate mortgages thus
resemble the risk-free long-term debt contracts derived in case A of Figure 4.
The ARMs are e⁄ectively short-term loans because they typically have a ￿xed ￿teaser￿
rate for 2 or 3 years, which is scheduled to rise by two or more percentage points after the
initial period ends. The rate hike often forces the home owners to re￿nance their mortgages
at the market rate, in the same spirit of rolling over the short-term debt on the interim
date of our model. If the housing price rises when the rate is reset, a home owner faces no
di¢ culty in re￿nancing his loan at the market rate. However, if the housing price falls, the
home owner will not be able to re￿nance his loan and will be strained by the largely increased
mortgage payment. As a result, he may be forced to turn over the home to his creditor.
21Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009) document that by mid-2008, serious delinquencies on
ARMs had risen to over 29 percent, while the similar rate for ￿xed-rate mortgages rose only
to 9 percent.5
Financial innovations, such as the securitization of subprime loans, were at least partially
responsible for the popularity of ARMs in the last decade. Thus the synchronous growth
of ARMs and housing prices during the recent boom, together with the large spike in the
delinquency rate of ARMs during the bust, match squarely with the situation described in
Proposition 8.6
Figure 4 also illustrates another possiblity, case B, in which each asset buyer has scarce
cash endowment. As a result, in the absence of short-term debt the equilibrium asset price
remains below PM despite the buyers￿aggresive use of long-term debt contract with face
value ￿. Then, the introduction of short-term debt allows the buyers to use a more modest
short-term debt contract with face value Kd. As a result, the equilibrium asset price drops,
accompanied by a reduction in credit used by the buyers.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the condition in (7) holds and that
(1 ￿ ￿)PM ￿ ￿c > CS (Kd):
Then, after the introduction of short-term debt, the equilibrium asset price on date 0 decreases
and the price decrease is accompanied by the shift to the more modest short-term debt contract
with face value Kd by at least some of the asset buyers.
Taken together, Propositions 8 and 9 demonstrate that introducing short-term debt could
either increase or decrease the credit used by optimists in the equilibrium, depending on the
severity of their cash constraints. If they are so severely constrained that the asset prices
remain low even after they have used extremely aggressive long-term debt, then introducing
short-term debt would actually allow them to reduce their leverages. This result is intriguing
from a theoretical perspective. However, this situation is probably less relevant to the recent
5The ARMs were primarily used to ￿nance the home purchases of sub-prime and near-prime households,
who were constrained from qualifying for the regular ￿xed-rate mortgages. Mian and Su￿ (2009) ￿nd that
from 2002 to 2005, areas with disproportionately large share of subprime borrowers in 1996 had experienced
an unprecedented growth in subprime credit, despite the sharply declining relative income growth in these
areas. Interestingly, these areas also had signi￿cantly higher mortgage delinquency rates in 2007 when the
housing prices across US started to decline.
6One could also attribute the synchronous growth of ARMs and housing prices to a growing divergence
of beliefs among agents about the housing-market fundamentals. This argument is also consistent with our
model, which we will analyze in the next subsection.
22housing boom and other historical episodes. Thus, we will focus on the situation identi￿ed
in Proposition 8 in the following analysis.
2.6 Heterogeneous Beliefs and Asset Price Cycles
In this subsection, we analyze the e⁄ects of agents￿heterogeneous beliefs in driving the
boom-and-bust cycle of asset prices. The standard result of Miller (1977) suggests that
heterogeneous beliefs cause asset overvaluation in the presence of short-sales constraints.
Our analysis will focus on the interaction between heterogeneous beliefs and debt ￿nancing
of optimistic buyers. For illustration, we use the following baseline parameter values:












d = 0:4: (12)
These numbers imply the following: Optimists consist of 30% of the population and each is
endowed with 0:5 dollar in cash. The ￿nal asset payo⁄ can be 1; 0:4, or 0:16: We let the
objective probability of the tree going up each period be 0:5 and the optimists and pessimists￿
beleifs be equally spread around the objective probability. As learning is likely to cause belief
dispersion to decrease over time, we make the beliefs of the optimists and pessimists on date
0 to be 0:7 and 0:3; and on date 1 in both of the u and d states to be 0:6 and 0:4:
In the illustration, we examine the equilibrium asset price dynamics when 1) only LD
(long-term debt) is available, and 2) both LD and SD (long-term and short-term debt) are
available. The di⁄erence between these two cases highlights the role of short-term debt. We
also discuss the debt contracts used by the asset buyers to ￿nance their purchases.
2.6.1 Initial Belief Dispersion on Date 0
We ￿rst examine the e⁄ect of the initial belief dispersion on date 0. We let the values of ￿h
0
and ￿l
0 to deviate from their baseline value and instead take the following values:
￿
h
0 = 0:5 + ￿0 and ￿
l
0 = 0:5 ￿ ￿0
where ￿0 changes from 0 to 0:45 and drives the initial belief dispersion between the optimists
and pessimists. Figure 5 illustrates the asset market and credit market equilibrium. Panel
A plots the date-0 asset price p0 with respect to ￿0. The horizontal dotted line at the 0:49
level represents the asset￿ s fundamental valued by the objective probabilities. The dotted
upward sloping line represents the asset price in the Miller setting, where optimists always










































































































Figure 5: The equilibrium e⁄ects of initial belief dispersion on asset and credit markets.
have su¢ cient funds to execute their purchases. As ￿0 increases from 0 to 0:45, the optimists
become more optimistic and p0 increases from 0:548 to 0:74 (p0 is higher than 0:49 at ￿0 = 0
because of the belief dispersion on date 1).
LD-only equilibrium The dashed line plots p0 when the optimists have access only to
long-term debt to ￿nance their asset purchases. Interestingly, this price decreases from 0:485
to 0:443 as ￿0 increases from 0 to 0:32 and then stays ￿ at as ￿0 increases further. The
dramatic di⁄erence between this line and the price under the Miller setting origins from the
optimists￿￿nancing cost. The increase in belief dispersion not only makes the optimists more
optimistic, but also makes the pessimists more pessimistic. As a result, optimists face more
costly ￿nancing from the pessimists even though their own valuation of the asset is higher.
The ￿nancing cost gives an indirect channel for the pessimists to a⁄ect the equilibrium price
despite the short-sales constraints. In the illustrated LD only equilibrium, the ￿nancing-
cost e⁄ect can even overturn the standard Miller result and cause the equilibrium price to
decrease with agents￿belief dispersion.
24Panel D provides a breakdown of the long-term debt contracts used by the optimists in the
LD only equilibrium. Initially, when ￿0 increases from 0 to 0:32; there is a mix of optimists
using long-term contracts with face values of ￿ and ￿
2 (e.g., the LD2 case in Proposition 5)
and the fraction of optimists using the risk-free contract with face value ￿
2 rises from 0:9 to
1. This fraction stays at 1 as ￿0 increases further (e.g., the LD1 case in Proposition 5).
Equilibrium with both SD and LD available The solid line in Panel A plots p0 when
the optimists can choose between long-term and short-term debt. p0 slightly decreases from
its initial value at 0:485 as ￿0 increases from 0 to 0:05, then monotonically increases to 0:58
as ￿0 increases further to 0:23, and ￿nally stays ￿ at at 0:58 as ￿0 continues to rise. This
pattern is dramatically di⁄erent from that of the asset price in the LD only equilibrium.
This di⁄erence highlights the role of short-term debt in reducing the optimists￿￿nancing
cost.
Panel B provides a breakdown of the short-term debt contracts used by the optimists.
Over the region ￿0 2 [0;0:05]; the optimists do not use any short-term debt. The reason is
Proposition 1: Short-term debt is advantageous to long-term debt only when the specualtive
incentives caused by both parties￿initial belief dispersion dominates the rollover-risk e⁄ect
due to their future belief dispersion. Once ￿0 rises above 0:05, the optimists start to use
a mix of short-term debt contracts with face values ￿
2 and Kd. The fraction of optimistis
using the more aggresive contract with face value Kd rises monotonically from 0 to 1 as
￿0 rises from 0:05 to 0:23, and stays at 1 as ￿0 rises further. This panel shows that the
increase of the equilibrium price with ￿0 in the region ￿0 2 [0:05;0:23] is ￿nanced by the
optimists￿increasing reliance on the short-term debt with face value Kd. Taken together,
even though the asset price in the collateral equilibrium is substantially lower than that in
the standard Miller setting, short-term debt allows the optimists to manage their ￿nancing
cost more e⁄ectively and thus to preserve the standard Miller result on the equilibrium price
increasing with agents￿belief dispersion.
Date-1 crash Panel C of Figure 5 plots the price drop on date 1 when the lower state d
is realized, i.e., pd ￿ p0, under di⁄erent settings. After the realization of the negative shock,
the asset price drops and the optimistic asset holders su⁄er losses on their positions. In the
Miller setting, as the date-0 price p0 monotonically increases with the initial belief dispersion
￿0, the price drop in state d also increases with ￿0. However, in the LD only equilibrium,
25the large ￿nancing cost constrains optimists from fully bidding up the asset price based on
their belief on date 0. As a result, the price drop in state d becomes decreasing with ￿0. In
contrast, the price drop in the setting with both LD and SD available is generally increasing
with ￿0. In fact, the slope of the price drop with respect to ￿0 in the LD-and-SD equilibrium
is even steeper than that in the Miller setting in the middle region. This is because of the
rollover risk e⁄ect. When the optimists are ￿nanced by short-term debt, they are forced to
turn over their asset to the pessimistic creditor after the negative shock. This causes the price
to drop more than that in the Miller setting, where the optimists are always the marginal
investor. This e⁄ect shows that not only can short-term debt fuel the asset over-valuation
on date 0, but can also exacerbate the downturn after a negative shock.
2.6.2 Future Belief Dispersion on Date 1
Next, we examine the e⁄ects of the belief dispersion between the optimists and pessimists on
date 1. We will focus on the dispersion in the lower state d. Proposition 1 suggests that the
belief dispersion in this state introduces rollover risk, which discourages optimists from using
short-term debt. Speci￿cally, we deviate from the baseline parameters in (12) by specifying
the following beliefs for the optimists and pessimists:
￿
h
d = 0:5 + ￿d; and ￿
l
d = 0:5 ￿ ￿d
where ￿d changes from 0 to 0:45: Figure 6 illustrates the impact on the asset and credit
markets.
Panel A of Figure 6 plots p0 with respect to ￿d. In the Miller setting, p0 is again increasing
with ￿d for the same reason as before￿ an increase in ￿d makes the optimists more optimistic
about the asset fundamental. In contrast, p0 decreases with ￿d in both the equilibria with
LD and SD and with LD only. This pattern is di⁄erent from the illustration in Figure 5￿
while p0 in the LD only equilibrium is decreasing with ￿0, p0 tends to increase with ￿0 when
both LD and SD are available. Taken together, Figures 5 and 6 suggest that when only
long-term debt is avaliable, an increase in either ￿0 or ￿d causes the equilibrium price to drop
because the increases in belief dispersion increases the optimists￿￿nacing cost and this e⁄ect
can dominate the increase in the optimists￿asset valuation. But when short-term debt is
available, these two types of belief dispersion can have di⁄erent impacts. In particular, an
increase in ￿d unambiguously discourages the use of short-term debt because of the increased









































































































Figure 6: The equilibrium e⁄ects of long-run belief dispersion in state d on the asset and credit
markets.
rollover risk. However, optimists may use short-term debt to take advantage of the trading
opportunity presented by the increase in ￿0, which leads the asset price to rise with ￿0.
In general, we can prove the following proposition regarding the e⁄ects of these two types
of belief dispersion on the date-0 equilibrium price.
Proposition 10 Based on the conditions listed in Proposition 8, the date-0 asset price p0
increases with the belief dispersion between the optimists and pessimists on date 0 and de-
creases with their belief dispersion in the lower interim state d:
3 An Extended Model with Learning
In this section, we extend the baseline model with learning. We allow each agent to update
his belief about the asset fundamental on date 1 based on the realized fundamental shock.
Such learning justi￿es the state-contingent beliefs speci￿ed in the baseline model. Learning
can also lead to the ￿ ips of beliefs across agents, which in turn intensi￿es the speculative
27incentives of agents through asset holders￿resale options, a la Harrison and Kreps (1978).
The learning technology we adopt is analogous to that used by Morris (1996).
3.1 The Model Setting
Suppose that the fundamental move on the tree is independently and identically distributed
in each period. Let ￿ be the unobservable probability of an upward jump. On date 0; each
agent has a prior about the distribution of ￿: There are three groups of risk-neutral agents,
who di⁄er in their priors about the distribution of ￿: We label these groups by A; B, and











where ￿i ￿ ￿i + ￿
i represents the agent￿ s con￿dence about his prior belief. This con￿dence
determines how much the agent reacts to new information on date 1:
On date 1, if the tree moves up, each agent will update his belief in response to the positive

















One can intuitively interpret the posterior belief as a weighted average of the prior belief ￿i
0
and the new information shock 1, where the weights depend on the con￿dence of the prior
￿i and the precision of the information 1. If the agent is more con￿dent about his prior, he
puts more weight on the prior but less weight on the information shock.



















x￿￿1 (1 ￿ x)
￿￿1 :
The mean of the distribution is ￿
￿+￿:
28To facilitate our analysis, we let the group-A agents be the optimists on date 0 and the










Furthermore, we assume that the two groups of pessimists di⁄er in the con￿dence of their
priors￿ ￿B > ￿A > ￿C￿ so that the group-C agents will react most strongly to the positive
shock in the interim state u and can become buyers of the group-A agents￿asset on date 1,
while group-B agents have the least reaction to the shocks, including the negative shock in
state d, and thus become the natural creditor to ￿nance the group-A agents￿asset purchases
on date 0. For simplicity, we assume that the group-B and group-C agents have su¢ cient
cash endowments to ful￿ll any trade or lending agreement they desire.
More speci￿cally, in the interim state u, the group-C agents become more optimistic than




















If so, group-A agents will sell their asset to group-C agents at a price equal to the group-C
agents￿valuation. Note that in state u, the group-B agents￿belief is always lower than that























The option to resell the asset to the group-C agents at a higher price is valuable to the
group-A agents, and motivates them to pay a price on date 0 that is higher than their
buy-and-hold valuation, even though they already hold the most optimistic valuation, e.g.,
Harrison and Kreps (1978). This speculative component in asset price has been widely used
to study asset-price bubbles, e.g., Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
3.2 The Financing-Cost E⁄ects on Price Bubble
In this section, we focus on analyzing how ￿nancing cost a⁄ects speculation by the optimists
and the equilibrium price bubble. We adopt the same assumptions from the baseline model
on the agents￿initial cash and asset endowments. In light of our analysis in the previous
section, their ￿nancing cost is determined by the creditor￿ s beliefs about the likelihood of
the default states. Since the group-B agents are less responsive to the negative shock in the
29Table 3: Asset Payo⁄ and Debt Payment in the Extended Model
Tree Path
uu ud du dd
Asset payo⁄ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿
2
Payo⁄ to the initial buyers pu pu ￿ ￿
2
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FS FS FS;1 ￿ FS ￿
2
Short-term debt face value FS 2 [Kd;￿] FS FS ￿ ￿
2
lower interim state d, credit provided by them is cheaper than that by the group-C agents.
We also assume that ￿B is not too large so that the belief of the group-B agents is always
lower than that of the group-A agents.
We can easily extend our derivation of the baseline model to cover the extended model.
The group-A agents correspond to the optimistic buyers in the baseline model, and the
group-B agents correspond to the pessimistic creditors. Their state-dependent beliefs are
now determined by their priors on date 0 and learning processes on date 1. The presence
of group-C agents provides group-A agents the resale option on date 1 in the upper state
u. We summarize the asset payo⁄ to the initial buyers and their debt payments from using
di⁄erent contracts in Table 3, which di⁄ers from Table 2 in the asset payo⁄ only on paths
uu and ud due to the resale option.
The changes in the asset payo⁄ to the initial buyers do not a⁄ect the payments of the
equilibrium-relevant debt contracts, and thus do not a⁄ect the buyers￿optimal debt maturity
choice given in Proposition 1. Propositions 3, 4, 5, and 6 also remain the same, except that
we have to modify the expressions for PM; PL; and PH to account for the changes in the







































































































































































































To illustrate the e⁄ects of ￿nancing cost on the asset price bubble, we use a set of
numerical examples, based on the following baseline parameters:






We focus on varying the values of ￿B and ￿C; which control the learning intensities of the
creditors to the initial asset buyers and the potential new buyers of the asset, respectively.
Figure 7 illustrates the equilibrium e⁄ects of varying ￿C from 0 to 1 and ￿B from 1
to 3: As ￿C decreases, the belief of the group-C agents (the potential asset buyers in the
upper interim state u) becomes more responsive to the information shock on date 1 and
thus increases the initial buyers￿resale option value in the upper state u. Panel A plots the
equilibrium price p0 with respect to ￿C. The ￿ at dotted line at 0:725 provides the group-
A agents￿buy-and-hold value on date 0, while the dashed line with big dots provides their
31valuation in the Harrison-Kreps setting, which takes into account the resale option under the
assumption that they always have su¢ cient funds for their asset purchases. The Harrison-
Kreps price starts to rise above the buy-and-hold value as ￿C drops below a critical level
around 0:48, below which the group-C agents￿belief in the u state becomes higher than that
of the group-A agents.
The ￿ at dashed line at 0:686 represents the equilibrium price when the buyers have access
to only long-term debt. As this line is substantially below the group-A agents￿buy-and-hold
valuation on date 0; it suggests that the cost of using long-term debt ￿nancing severely
constrains the optimists from biding up the asset price. Interestingly, the solid line shows
that once the optimists are allowed to use short-term debt, the equilibrium price is always
above the price level in the LD only equilibrium, and starts to rise when ￿C drops below 0:48
in parallel with the Harrison-Kreps price. In fact, the price eventually passes the optimists￿
buy-and-hold valuation when ￿C drops below 0:26: This suggests that the cheap ￿nancing
provided by short-term debt makes it possible for the optimists to bid up the price to levels
closer to their speculative valuations without ￿nancing cost. Panel B also plots the types of
short-term debt contracts used by the initial buyers. The plot shows that the price increase
is ￿nanced by their increasing use of the more aggressive debt contract with face value Kd.
As ￿B increases, the belief of the group-B agents (the creditor to the initial buyers)
becomes more stable in the lower interim state d and thus reduces the buyers￿rollover risk.
Panel C of Figure 7 plots the equilibrium price p0 with respect to ￿B: The plot gives the two
benchmark price levels, the group-A agents￿buy-and-hold valuation and the Harrison-Kreps
price by the two horizontal lines at 0:725 and 0:74, respectively. If group-A agents have
access to only long-term debt, the ￿nancing cost constrains them to bid up the price only
to 0:686, which is substantially below the two benchmark levels. When short-term debt is
available, the ￿nancing cost becomes lower, especially when the rollover risk is low. Panel
C shows that as ￿B increases, the reduced ￿nancing cost allows the optimists to bid up the
price closer to the Harrison-Kreps price. In fact, the two prices coincide when ￿B = 3, at
which point ￿A
d = ￿B
d (i.e., there is no rollover risk.)
4 Discussion
In this section, we relate our model to several bubble-and-crisis episodes and discuss various
model implications.
32The credit crisis of 2007-2008 This crisis followed a dramatic housing price boom
across many areas of US from late 1990s to 2007. Di⁄erent from many previous regional
housing booms, which were typically stimulated by excitements about the economic and/or
population growth of the involved regions, this national housing boom was at least partially
stimulated by the ￿nancial innovation of securitizing non-standard sub-prime mortgage loans,
which had held the promise of broadening home ownership to many low-income households.
Like many technology innovations in the past, this innovation had stimulated widespread
housing speculation across the country. As we have discussed in Section 2.5, this housing
boom was accompanied by a rapid growth of ARMs, a type of short-term mortgage loans,
which allowed many subprime or near-prime households to ￿nance their home purchases
with low down payments. Interestingly, these ARMs also experienced much higher default
rates when the housing prices started to decline after 2007 and thus exacerbated the housing
market downturn.
Like the households, investment banks also experienced a concurrent leverage cycle.
Adrian and Shin (2008) show that during the housing market boom before 2007, invest-
ment banks had aggressively expanded their holdings of mortgage-backed securities and
other assets by using repurchase agreements (repos), a form of short-term debt collaterized
by liquid ￿nancial assets. Interestingly, not only had investment banks used higher leverages,
the maturity of their repo ￿nancing had also been signi￿cantly shortened. According Brun-
nermeier (2009), the fraction of total investment bank assets ￿nanced by overnight repos
roughly doubled from 2000 to 2007, while fraction by term repos with a maturity of up to
three months have stayed roughly constant. In other words, investment banks had gradually
increased their reliance on overnight ￿nancing during the housing booming. The increased
reliance on overnight repos later contributed to the collapses of Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers in 2008 because both had di¢ culties in rolling over their repos, e.g., Brunnermeier
(2009), Gorton and Metrick (2009), and Krishnamurthy (2010).
The 1929 crash The 1920s was a decade of expansion, propelled by new information
technologies like radio and new processes like motor vehicle production using assembly-line
methods. These new technologies had stimulated intensive speculation in the stock market,
and leverages were widely used by ￿rms, trusts and individuals to ￿nance their speculation.
White (1990) provides detailed information on the New York Stock Exchange￿ s brokers￿
loans, which allowed investors to borrow on margin from their brokers to ￿nance their stock
33purchases. He shows that the volume of brokers￿loans had risen and fallen in sync with the
stock market index throughout the boom-and-bust period between 1926 and 1930. Like the
modern repos, there were two types of brokers￿loans, call loans (demand loans) and time
loans with common maturities of 60 and 90 days. Rappoport and White (1993) document
evidence of maturity shortening for brokers￿loans before the stock market crash in October
1929: ￿In 1926 and 1927, time loans accounted for between 21 and 32 percent of all brokers￿
loans, but after mid-1928, they declined to under 10 percent.￿
The Emerging-Market Debt Crisis in 1990s Short-term debt had also been heavily
used by many emerging countries to ￿nance their economic booms in the 1990s. According
to Rodrik and Velasco (1999), the outstanding stock of debt of emerging-market economy
roughly doubled between 1988 and 1997, from $1 trillion to $2 trillion. While medium-
and long-term debt grew rapidly as well, it was short-term debt that rose particularly rapid
during this period. They further show that in a data sample covering 32 emerging-market
economies over the period 1988-1998, the ratio of short-term debt to foreign reserve is a
robust predictor of ￿nancial crises triggered by reversals of capital ￿ ows. Reinhart and
Rogo⁄(2009) provide similar evidence in a larger sample of emerging-market economies over
a longer period.
Demand-driven credit expansions One common feature across the aforementioned
three ￿nancial market boom-and-bust episodes, which occurred in di⁄erent time periods
and in di⁄erent countries, is that the booms were all heavily ￿nanced by short-term debt.
It is important to di⁄erentiate the shortening of debt maturity during the booming peri-
ods from another common phenomenon￿ the shortening of debt maturity during the crises.
When a crisis disrupts, creditors tend to become more averse to uncertainty and illiquidity.
As a result, they are less willing to lend and especially less willing to lend for longer terms.
Such a contraction from the supply side can easily explain the shortening of debt maturity
during crises. However, it is not so obvious for any supply-driven credit expansion theory to
explain the shortening of debt maturity during booms.
To the extent that short-term debt reduces the borrowers￿￿nancial stability, the increas-
ing short-term leverages during the aforementioned market booms re￿ ected the borrowers￿
optimism about the future market perspectives, as well as the creditors￿concerns about the
borrowers￿ability to repay their debt in the long term. Thus, these short-term credit booms
34were at least partically driven by demands of borrowers to speculate in the asset markets.
Of course, neither can one deny the importance of the ready availability of credit from the
supply side. The global savings glut and low interest rate environment in the early 2000s had
made abundant credit available to the housing speculators and optimistic investment banks.
The ample gold reserves accumulated by the US during World War I also made credit readily
available for stock speculators during the stock market boom before 1929, e.g., Eichengreen
and Mitchener (2003).
Our model provides an analytical framework based on the heterogeneous beliefs between
the optimistic borrowers and not so optimistic creditors to help understand credit expansions
from the demand side. In particular, our model provides a sharp prediction about the type of
debt contracts used in the expansions: Greater initial disagreement about asset fundamentals
makes short-term debt more preferably; while greater future disagreement makes long-term
debt more preferably.
Predicting future crises There have been many ￿nancial market booms. But not every
boom ended with a ￿nancial crisis. What is so special about the three episodes discussed
above? The high leverages and, more importantly, the high short-term leverages used by
the optimistic speculators are certainly crucial. Across all these episodes, short-term debt
created the speculators￿￿nancing di¢ culties during the downturns. In the absence of short-
term debt, the speculators would have su⁄ered large losses when the fundamental shocks went
against them, but the markets may not have experienced the severe crises. The experience
of the Internet bubble in the late 1990s is a good example. While the day traders of the
Internet stocks had lost substantial wealth when the bubble burst in early 2000, not any
major bank or ￿nancial institution had failed, very di⁄erent from the situation after the
decline of the housing market in 2007. In junction with our model, we have the following
prediction: The combination of a short-term credit boom and an asset price boom tend to
predict a higher probability of future ￿nancial crisis.
Consistent with this prediction, Borio and Drehmann (2009) show that unusually strong
increases of both credit and asset prices have out-of-sample predicting power for banking
crises by using data from 1980 to 2008 and across a set of countries.
Regulating short-term leverages Should the policy makers regulate short-term lever-
ages? Our model suggests that this issue is subtle as Propositions 8 and 9 indicate opposite
35e⁄ects of short-term debt on the equilibrium depending on the market condition. When
the optimistic asset buyers￿initial cash endowment is above a certain threshold, introducing
short-term debt induces them to take on higher leverages and push the asset price even
higher. The opposite can happen if their cash endowment is below the threshold. In this
situation the buyers are so cash-constrained that they use high long-term leverages to ￿-
nance their asset purchases, then introducing short-term debt allows them to replace the
high long-term leverages with lower short-term leverages and thus to reduce the asset price.
5 Conclusion
Appendix A Proofs for Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
There are two cases depending on whether the short-term debt is risky. Suppose that the





: Then, on date 0 the optimistic
borrower can raise DS (FS) = FS from the debt contract. His expected debt payment is










































On the other hand, the long-term debt contract that delivers the same initial credit as FS



























































































































The short-term debt contract is less costly if and only if (7) is satis￿ed.
36We follow a similar procedure for the case that FS 2 (Kd;￿]. The borrower￿ s expected


























and the date-0 credit that the borrower receives is

































































































































































Again, the short-term debt is less costly if and only if (7) holds.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that the borrower￿ s optimal face value F is lower than ￿
2: The contract could be
long-term or short-term. Since the face value is lower than ￿
2; the debt contract is risk free
across all the four possible paths, i.e., e D = F: As a result, the expected debt payment to the
borrower is F and the date-0 credit the borrower gets is also F: Then, according to equation













Now, consider increasing the debt face value by a tiny amount ￿: The debt contract is still
risk free, and the borrower￿ s expected value becomes
c + p0








￿ F ￿ ￿
i
:





; this expression is increasing with ￿: In other words, the borrower is better
o⁄ by borrowing more. This contradicts with F being the optimal debt face value. Thus,
the optimal debt face value cannot be lower than ￿
2:
Next, suppose that the borrower￿ s optimal face value F is higher than ￿: The contract
could be long-term or short-term. We denote the debt payment on date 2 as e D0: Since the
face value is higher than ￿; the borrower always default on the debt contract except at the
end of the path uu. That is, e ￿ ￿ e D0 equals 1 ￿ F at the end of the path uu; and 0 at the










e ￿ ￿ e D0
￿
:
Consider reducing the debt face value by a tiny amount ￿: We denote the debt payment of
the new contract by e D1: Note that e D1 di⁄ers from e D0 only by ￿￿ at the end of the path uu.























































































Thus, the borrower￿ s expected value increases with ￿; which contradicts with F being the
optimal debt face value. This suggests that the optimal debt face value cannot be higher
than ￿:
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
On date 0; the borrower￿ s expected value is given in (6). Based on the asset payo⁄and debt










































By substituting this and CL (FL) in (1) into (6), we derive the borrower￿ s date-0 expected
value as































































































As a result, the borrower￿ s optimal long-term debt leverage is ￿ if p0 < PM; is ￿
2 if p0 > PM;
and is either ￿ or ￿
2 if p0 = PM:
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4






On date 0, the borrower￿ s expected value VS (FS) is given in (6). Note that in this case
CS (FS) = FS. By substituting in the expression of e DS in Table 2 and FS;1 in (4), we have












































































Next, we consider FS 2 [Kd;￿]: Similarly, by substituting the expression of e DS in Table
2 into (6), we obtain












p0 ￿ DS (FS)




















































= Kd. It is



























and [Kd;￿]; it is
direct to verify the borrower￿ s optimal short-term debt face value given in Proposition 4.
Finally we show that PL < PM < PH, where three objects are de￿ned in (17), (13), and






























39Simple calculation shows that it is equivalent to (7). Now we show that PL < PM. The
term involving ￿









2 which cancels out. Because
the sum of coe¢ cients of 1; ￿, and ￿
2 is one for PL and PM, it su¢ ces to show that PL has

























Simplifying, we ￿nd that this is equivalent to (7).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
We only need to prove that there is no incentive for any optimistic buyer to save cash on
date 0. The only reason to save cash is that on date 1 the asset might be under-valued in
the lower state d if some other asset holders run into distress and causes the asset to be
under-valued. According to Proposition 7, this situation arises in cases LD2 and LD3, in
which at least some of the asset holders use debt contract with face value ￿. Thus, we will
focus on these cases.
First, suppose that the equilibrium falls in either case LD2 or LD3. What is the marginal
value for an optimistic buyer to save a small amount "? Going forward, if the state moves into













(Proposition 7). He can further lever up by using a debt contract with face value ￿
2 (one
can show that he has no incentive to use a di⁄erent face value.) Thus, he can use his cash
to a position of size "






















































Next, we show that the marginal value of establishing an asset position on date 0 is
greater than that of saving cash. If the buyer uses the cash " to increase his date-0 position,











p0 ￿ CL (FL)
:
In the equilibrium cases LD2 and LD3, the face value of the buyer￿ s optimal debt contract
FL is either ￿ or ￿









































































































Also note that for the long-term debt to be used in equilibrium, the condition in (7) needs


























, the marginal value of
saving cash on date 0. Thus, there is no incentive for any buyer to save cash on date 0.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
The only non-trivial part of the proposition is that the buyers have no incentive to save
cash on date 0. To prove this, we again compare the marginal value of establishing an asset
position and saving cash on date 0. The marginal value of saving cash is higher than 1 in
the equilibrium cases SD2, SD3, SD4, and SD5. In these cases, at least some of the buyers
use debt contracts with face values Kd or ￿, and thus will run into distress on date 1 in
the lower state d: Following the proof of Proposition 5, in these cases the marginal value of










First, we consider the marginal value of establishing a larger asset position in cases SD2













where the debt face value FS could be either Kd or ￿
2. Since p0 ￿ PH in these cases (Figure























which is the marginal value of saving cash on date 0.
Next, we consider the cases SD4 and SD5. According to equation (16), the marginal






























0. Note that for
the short-term debt to be desirable in equilibrium, the condition in (7) needs to hold. This

















Thus, the marginal value of establishing a larger asset position on date 0 is higher than that
of saving cash.
In summary of all the cases considered above, there is no incentive for any buyer to save
cash on date 0:
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose that the optimistic asset holders acquired their asset holdings on date 0 using
collateralized long-term debt contracts with face value FL: Then, if a new buyer wants to
purchase the asset on date 1; how much does he need to pay? Note that not only does the
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In the upper state u; it is easy to see that regardless of the debt face value, the debt is






In the lower state d; the debt can be risky if the face value is ￿ and risk free if it is ￿
2.
Thus, in case LD1, the equilibrium asset price is still determined by the optimistic asset





: However, in cases LD2 and LD3, at least some of the asset holders
used debt contracts with face value ￿: Now, they will surely default on their debt on date 2
























The date-1 equilibrium for cases SD1, SD2, SD3, SD4, and SD5 can be derived in a
similar way.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 10
According to Figure 4, the equilibrium identi￿ed by the conditions of Proposition 8 can be
either in the SD2 or SD3 case of Proposition 6. We consider these cases separately.
In the SD3 case, the date-0 asset price is given by
p0 =













8The new buyer can still use leverage (possibly provided by pessimists) to purchase the asset at t = 1;
but this does not a⁄ect how much he needs to pay the original buyer and creditor.
42which is indi⁄erent to ￿0 and decreases with ￿d:
In the SD2 case, the date-0 price is given by













































First, we consider the comparative static with respect to ￿0: Note that p0 depends on only
￿h
0 = 0:5 + ￿0, but not on ￿l





























































































2, this inequality holds. Thus,
p0 increases with ￿0:
We now consider the comparative static with respect to ￿d, which a⁄ects p0 through
￿h
d = 0:5 + ￿d and ￿l
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0 (0:5 ￿ ￿d)
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which proves that p0 decreases with ￿d.
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